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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Supreme Court held that the common law principle that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent was embedded
in the Constitution's structure when it was ratified.' The Court, however, has
not always adhered to this view. In 1793, when a citizen of South Carolina
sued the State of Georgia to enforce a debt arising from the sale of Revolu-
tionary War supplies, the Court ordered the State to fulfill its obligation even
* J.D. 2005. I would like to thank Professor Nina Mendelson for her support and valuable
insights. I would also like to thank Christian Grostic, Joel Flaxman, Andrew Goetz, Jeremy Suhr,
Krista Caner, Khalil Maalouf, and Lisette Osorio for their helpful substantive comments and editing
work.
I. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-28 (1999). Although states subjected themselves to
Article ll federal judicial power, the states did not surrender their common law right to immunity
from private suits. James Eugene Fitzgerald, Comment, State Sovereign Immunity: Searching for
Stability, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2001) (discussing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10
(1890)).
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though the State had not consented to the suit.2 Alarmed by the sudden
opening of their treasuries to federal courts over which they had no control,
states swiftly pushed through Congress and ratified the Eleventh Amend-
ment.3 Although the facts that triggered the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment are undisputed, the Amendment's core purpose has long been
the subject of debate. While the language of the Amendment suggests that
the most immediate purpose was reversing Chisholm v. Georgia and closing
state treasuries to federal courts,4 its broader purpose may have been con-
firming sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle and thus protecting
the states' dignity interests.
Although the Supreme Court has extended Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity to a wide variety of bodies that states have created to administer their
affairs, no practical and uniform method exists for determining whether
such an entity is entitled to it. Federal courts, relying on particular views
about the Amendment's core purpose, have created different "arm-of-the-
state" tests to determine whether a particular entity should benefit from the
state's immunity from suit. In Mount Healthy City School District Board of
6Education v. Doyle, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test in holding
that a school district was a political subdivision, rather than an arm of the
state. The Court first noted that Ohio law classified school districts as politi-
cal subdivisions.7 Moreover, although the Ohio State Board of Education
provided some guidance and funding to school districts, the districts had
extensive powers to raise revenue by issuing bonds and levying taxes. The
school district's status under state law and its ability to generate its own
revenue outweighed the state's financial assistance and administrative con-
2. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
3. MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A REFERENCE GUIDE To THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 34-36 (2002). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. DURCHSLAG, supra note 3, at 34-36.
5. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-26, 728-29. The Court has not confined the Amendment to its
language, but has rather relied on historical sources to expand the Amendment's scope. Tenn. Stu-
dent Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004) ("For over a century, however, we have
recognized that the States' sovereign immunity is not limited to the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment."); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (quoting Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994)) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not
exist solely to prevent "federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"); Blatch-
ford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[Wle have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional
structure which it confirms .... ). Accordingly, the Court long ago held that citizens cannot even
sue their own state in federal court. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-17.
6. 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977).
7. Id. at 280.
8. Id.
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trol.9 The Court, however, did not explain the relative weight of the factors
or indicate if other factors could be considered.0
In its next arm-of-the-state case, Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency," the Court employed more factors in holding that the Ta-
hoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"), an entity created by an interstate
compact between California and Nevada, was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 2 The Court reached its conclusion after finding that:
(1) the interstate compact described TRPA as a "separate legal entity" and a
"political subdivision;" (2) counties and cities, rather than the states, ap-
pointed most of the directors of TRPA; (3) counties and cities provided
TRPA's funding; (4) the compact provided that TRPA's obligations were not
binding on either state; (5) local rather than state governments performed
TRPA's function, the regulation of land; and (6) TRPA's authority to make
rules was not subject to a veto by the state.'3 The Court noted that "[t]he
intentions of Nevada and California, the terms of the Compact, and the ac-
tual operation of TRPA" made it clear that TRPA could not claim sovereign
immunity. 1
The Court in Lake Country Estates conducted a more comprehensive
analysis than it had in Mount Healthy. In assessing the control factor, the
Lake Country Estates Court looked at who selected the entity's directors and
whether the states had veto power over the entity's decisions. 5 This pro-
vided more guidance to lower courts than the Court's remark in Mount
Healthy that school districts received "some guidance" from the Ohio State
Board of Education. 6 Moreover, by asking whether the states would be li-
able for TRPA's debts, the Court in Lake Country Estates directly
considered the vulnerability of the state's treasury to a potential judgment. 7
Finally, in Lake Country Estates, the Court examined for the first time the
state's intent in creating the entity and the entity's actual operation. 1s
Although Lake Country Estates offered more guidance than Mount
Healthy, lower courts struggled in applying the arm-of-the-state test. The
Third Circuit stated that Lake Country Estates did not set out "an exclusive
9. Id.
10. Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity:
Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1263
(1992).
11. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
12. Pursuant to congressional consent as required by the Constitution, Nevada and California
created the TRPA to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin and to conserve
its natural resources. Id. at 393-94. These bi-state entities are called Compact Clause entities.
13. Id. at 401-02.
14. Id. at 402.
15. Id. at 401-02.
16. 429 U.S. at 280.
17. 440 U.S. at 402.
18. Id.
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list of factors to be considered. ' 9 In addition, some courts added their own
criteria 0 and others weighed the factors differently.2' The District of Colum-
bia Circuit underscored specific problems with the status under state law
and control factors.22 It also added its own twist to the control factor by con-
sidering the states' power to remove or suspend the state-appointed directors
from office." The clearest indication of confusion was when the Second and
Third Circuits reached different conclusions regarding the same bi-state en-
tity: the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation ("Authority").2 The
circuits reached different outcomes because they weighed the factors differ-
ently and took different information into consideration to determine whether
25the factors were met. When the Supreme Court first resolved the split, it
did so without addressing the different applications of the ann-of-the-state
test.
26
Four years later, the Court again dealt with the Authority's immunity
and articulated the "twin reasons" analysis in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp.27 Noting that indicators of immunity did not point in the same
28direction, the Court stated that the Eleventh Amendment's "twin reasons
19. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., 819 F.2d 413, 417 (3d
Cir. 1987).
20. Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coil. Dist., 861 F2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. l988) (considering
whether the entity had the power to take property in its own name); Port Auth. Police Benevolent
Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 417 (adding whether the entity performed a governmental or a proprietary func-
tion, whether the entity had the power to sue and be sued, and whether the property of the entity was
immune from state taxation); Tuveson v. Fla. Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d
730, 734 (1 th Cir. 1984) (considering the Council's functions, the way the legislature treated it, and
state court decisions).
21. See Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 E2d 435, 438-39 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25 (5th Cir.
1980)) (holding that the treatment of the entity in state courts is the most important factor). Contra
Tuvenson, 734 F.2d at 732 (citing Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 980 (8th Cir.); Blake v. Kline,
612 F.2d 718, 723 (3d Cir. 1979)) ("Several courts of appeals have regarded the final factor, who
ultimately pays, as the most crucial.").
22. Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that it was not clear what the purpose of the state law factor was and how courts should evaluate
the control factor).
23. Id. at 228.
24. Compare Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 418 (holding that the entity
enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity), with Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d
628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (holding otherwise). The Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jer-
sey, which was created through a bi-state compact between the two states with the consent of
Congress. Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp, 495 U.S. 299, 301 (1990).
25. The Second Circuit weighed more heavily the fact that neither State was liable for the
entity's debts, Feeney, 873 F.2d at 631, while the Third Circuit weighed more heavily the fact that
state courts had treated the entity as a state agency performing functions on behalf of the states, Port
Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 415.
26. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305 (holding that the states had waived the entity's potential Elev-
enth Amendment immunity).
27. 513 U.S. 30(1994).
28. The first factor, state control, pointed towards immunity because the states appointed all
directors and could block the Authority's measures. Id. at 44. The second factor, status under state
[Vol. 105:837
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for being"-respecting the dignity of the states and insulating state treasur-
ies from federal-court judgments-should be the prime guide in such a
situation.29 The Court first found no threat to the dignity of either New York
or New Jersey.3° Then, the Court found that the two states and Congress had
not designed the Authority to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.3 Al-
though the two states exercised significant control over the Authority,
control was not considered determinative because state control of counties
and other political subdivisions does not make these entities immune from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 2 The Court next evaluated the vulner-
ability of the state's purse, noting that various Courts of Appeals had
recognized it as the most salient factor in determining Eleventh Amendment
immunity.33 The Court ultimately decided that this factor was not met be-
cause the Authority had a long history of paying its own debts and its actual
financial independence contrasted with other entities that placed heavy fis-
cal tolls on their founding states.34 The Authority did not enjoy immunity
because a judgment against it would not, as a practical matter, expend itself
against the state treasury.3 5
This Note argues that Hess failed to provide an adequate standard for de-
termining whether an entity is an arm of the state and proposes such a
standard. Part I argues that Hess is not an appropriate approach for three rea-
sons. First, Hess does not provide uniformity in solving the arm-of-the-state
law, pointed in both directions. On the one hand, state courts had categorized the Authority as an
agency of the states rather than a municipal or local unit. Id. at 45. On the other hand, the compact
and the implementing legislation had not typed the Authority as a "state agency," but rather a "joint
or common agency," a "body corporate and politic," and a "municipal corporate instrumentality." Id.
at 44-45. The third factor, whether the Authority served state as opposed to local functions, pointed
in neither direction because states and municipalities alike owned and operated bridges, tunnels,
ferries, airports, marine terminals, etc. Id. at 45. However, the fourth factor pointed against immu-
nity because the states lacked financial responsibility for the Authority, it generated its own revenue,
and it had operated for decades without receiving any money from the states. Id. at 45-46.
29. Id. at 39-40,47.
30. The Court found that allowing plaintiffs to pursue their claims in federal court was not an
affront to the Compact Clause entity because the federal court was not an instrument of a distant
disconnected sovereign in relation to the entity, but was ordained by Congress, one of the entity's
founders. Id. at 41-42. The Court, however, did not explain how to evaluate this criterion in case the
entity was not formed pursuant to the Compact Clause. See infra note 42.
31. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47 (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979)). While the Court articulated two "twin reasons" for the Eleventh
Amendment, it considered the control factor before turning to the financial factor.
32. Id. at 47. The Court further undermined the control factor by indicating that gauging
control could be a "perilous inquiry" and "an uncertain and unreliable exercise." Id. (citing Rogers,
supra note 10, at 1284).
33. Id. at 48.
34. Id. at 49-50.
35. Id. at 50 (citing Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 227 (1986)).
The Court modified this standard shortly thereafter. In Regents of the University of California v.
Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997), a unanimous Court held that it was "the entity's potential legal liability,
rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability
in the first instance," that was relevant. Id. at 431. This holding departed from Hess, which con-
cluded that immunity depended primarily on whether, as a practical matter, the state's treasury
would be vulnerable to a judgment. 513 U.S. at 50.
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inquiry. Second, Hess's nearly exclusive focus on the vulnerability of the
state's treasury ignores other legitimate Eleventh Amendment interests.
Third, Hess is counterproductive from a public policy perspective because it
does not allow relatively autonomous entities to be considered arms of the
state. Part I solves these problems by presenting and arguing for an alterna-
tive three-prong test that safeguards legitimate Eleventh Amendment
concerns and promotes efficient public administration. This test considers
three elements, each of which protects a core Eleventh Amendment purpose.
To protect the state's dignity interests, courts should first look at state intent.
Second, to protect state treasuries, courts should evaluate the state's legal
and practical liability for the judgment. Third, to give due consideration to
the state's ability to administer its affairs, courts should determine whether
the entity serves a state function. An entity that meets at least two of these
factors should have immunity because only then would Eleventh Amend-
ment interests be strongly implicated.
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE HESS APPROACH
This Part argues that the Supreme Court's approach in Hess is objec-
tionable for three reasons. Section L.A argues that Hess does not promote
uniformity in solving an important federal issue: which entities are clothed
with Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section I.B argues that Hess does not
fully protect legitimate Eleventh Amendment interests because it gives un-
due weight to the state treasury factor. Finally, Section I.C contends that
Hess is counterproductive from a public policy perspective because it pro-
vides disincentives for public-private partnerships and entity independence.
These problems suggest that the Court should adopt a new test.
A. Lack of Uniformity
Hess did not provide uniformity to the arm-of-the-state test. First, Hess
left important questions unanswered regarding the overall application of the
"twin reasons" analysis, allowing courts to address these differently. Sec-
ond, Hess allowed courts to choose which and how many factors to
consider. Third, Hess provided meager guidance to courts about how to
evaluate whether a factor is met and how to weigh the different factors. The
disparity that Hess has promoted disserves the strong interest in the uniform
interpretation of federal law.
The arm-of-the-state test needs clarification. Hess left unanswered
whether the legal liability of the state for the judgment is the most important
36factor or the only factor to be considered. Some courts have followed the
36. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Brotherton v. Cleveland,
173 F.3d 552, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999)) (stating that, after Hess, it is unclear whether the question of
who pays a damage judgment against an entity is the only factor or merely the principal one in the
arm-of-the-state analysis); see also Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000)
(citing Duke v. Grady Mun. Sch., 127 F3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[E]ven after Hess and Doe,
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holding in Regents of the University of California v. Doe 7 that the key issue
is the state's legal liability for an adverse judgment, rather than the practical
impact of the judgment on the state's treasury, 8 but the Eleventh Circuit has
granted immunity based solely on practical impact3 9 and a district court in
the District of Columbia has granted immunity without even considering the
state's legal liability for the judgment.40 Even when courts consider the
amount of funds that an entity receives from the state, it is not clear how
much an entity must receive to meet the state treasury factor.4' Besides these
uncertainties regarding the state treasury factor, it is unsettled how lower
courts should evaluate the "dignity of the state" inquiry in non-Compact
42Clause cases. Circuits are even divided on whether Hess applies to non-
Compact Clause cases.43 In addition, while some courts have afforded in-
munity to private corporations acting as agents of the state," other courts are
which emphasized the primacy of the impact on the state treasury as a factor in determining immu-
nity, other factors remain relevant.").
37. 519 U.S. at431.
38. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have asked whether, under state law, the state would
be legally liable for the judgment against an entity to evaluate whether the state treasury factor is
met. Indep. Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1997);
Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 2002); Eason v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 303 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, some circuits have explicitly rejected
arguments that the practical impact of a judgment on the state's treasury is relevant. Holz v. Nenana
City Pub. Sch. Dist., 347 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003); Fresenius Med. Care Cardio. Res., Inc. v.
P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 75 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 941 (1st Cir. 1993)); Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
294 F.3d 684, 693 (5th Cir. 2002); Duke, 127 F.3d at 980-81.
39. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327-28 (11 th Cir. 2003).
40. The court only remarked that Massachusetts did not pledge its full faith and credit to the
repayment of bonds that the entity issued. U.S. ex rel K & R Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency,
154 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2001).
41. The Fifth Circuit afforded immunity to the Education Service Centers ("Centers") in
Texas because they received the "lion's share" of their budget from the state, but did not specify
what this amount was. Perez, 307 F.3d at 328-29.
42. Compare Harter v. Vernon, 101 3d 334, 337-40 (4th Cir. 1996) (reducing the state
dignity inquiry to "[w]hether the entity exercises a significant degree of autonomy from the state,
whether it is involved with local versus statewide concerns, and how it is treated as a matter of state
law"), with Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering
the state's scheme for liability of the entity, its source of funding, and the level of state control in
assessing if a suit against the entity would be an affront to the dignity of the state). For a definition
of Compact Clause entities, see supra note 12.
43. The Fifth Circuit's approach is perhaps the most divergent among the circuits because it
explicitly rejected Hess's applicability to single-state entities and it "largely ignore[s] Lake Country
Estates." Vogt, 294 F3d at 689 n.2. The Eighth Circuit has also questioned Hess's applicability in
non-Compact Clause cases. Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty. Technical Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1439 (8th Cir.
1996). Contra Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 n.1 (1997) (applying Hess to a single-state en-
tity); Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 66 (same); Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293 (same).
44. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1326 (citing Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech
St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310-11, 1313 (1 1th Cir. 2000)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 412 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Skoblow v. Ameri-Manage,
Inc., 483 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
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reluctant to do so.45 Even after Hess, the arm-of-the-state doctrine is confus-
ing and difficult to apply.46
Hess did not lead to uniformity in the factors that circuits consider be-
cause its two-prong test applies only "[w]hen indicators of immunity point
in different directions.4  Accordingly, the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
48Circuits did not alter their arm-of-the-state tests at all in response to Hess.
Other circuits, however, have slightly adjusted their tests.49 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has not followed a consistent approach, sometimes applying its pre-
Hess test and sometimes applying a modified test.50 The different factors the
45. See Mass. Hous., 154 E Supp. 2d at 23 (stating that a factor weighing against immunity
was that the activities of the MHFA resembled those of a bank and thus were proprietary in nature);
Shands, 208 F.3d at 1311 (finding no cases on point in which Eleventh Amendment immunity was
provided to a private corporation).
46. Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293 ("The jurisprudence over how to apply the arm-of-the-state
doctrine is, at best, confused."); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 1995) (describing Hess as
"an opinion that is certain to generate confusion").
47. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994).
48. The Third Circuit continues to use its own three-factor test: 1) whether the judgment
would be paid out of the state's treasury, 2) the status of the agency under state law, and 3) the de-
gree of autonomy the agency enjoys. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 347 n.21 (3d Cir.
1999) (noting that Hess did not alter the circuit's test because Hess did not adopt any test).
A district court in the Seventh Circuit continued to use the circuit's three factor test after Hess:
1) the extent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state; 2) its general legal status; and 3)
whether it serves the state as a whole or only a region. Lewis v. N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 898
F Supp. 596, 599 (N.D. I1. 1995) (citing Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845-47 (7th Cir.
1987)).
Courts in the Eighth Circuit "typically look at the degree of local autonomy and control and
most importantly whether the funds to pay any award would be derived from the state treasury."
Hadley, 76 F.3d at 1439 (quoting Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 1985)). Shortly
after Hess, the Eighth Circuit established that it saw "nothing inconsistent with the majority's rea-
soning in Hess and the approach [it] ha[d] developed for deciding whether a particular institution
is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity" Id.
The Ninth Circuit has continued using the five-factor test it developed before Hess. Holz, 347
F.3d at 1180. This test considers:
1) [W]hether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds; 2) whether the entity
performs central governmental functions; 3) whether the entity may sue or be sued; 4) whether
the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the name of the state; and
5) the corporate status of the entity.
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988)).
49. The First Circuit restructured its seven-factor test into a two-prong inquiry after Hess.
Compare Fresenius, 322 E3d at 68, with Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991
F.2d 935, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit incorporated the two-prong Hess approach
into its analysis. Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293-94.
The Fourth Circuit has stated that Hess did not materially alter its arm-of-the-state test, Gray,
51 F.3d at 434, but it did clarify that "the impact on the state treasury is generally determinative
when the state will not have to pay for the judgment .... Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 339 (4th
Cir. 1996). When there is no impact on the state treasury, the Fourth Circuit continues to apply the
three-factor test it used before Hess. Id.
50. Compare Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 994-96 (10th Cir. 1993) (con-
sidering the characterization of the entity under state law, the guidance and control exercised by the
state over the entity, the degree of state funding received by the entity, and the entity's ability to
issue bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf), with Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind,
173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). The Tenth Circuit, however, has sometimes applied a
different framework in which it considers the same four factors, but in a two-prong test. See Stur-
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circuits consider, and the inconsistency with which some circuits conduct
their tests, hamper the uniform examination of this issue.
Circuits not only consider a variety of factors, they also evaluate the fac-
tors differently.5' In examining the status of the entity under state law, the
First Circuit considered: (1) the entity's enabling act; (2) other statutes;
(3) state court decisions; (4) the entity's functions; and (5) the control the
state exercised over it. 52 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit exclusively consid-
ered that state law treated the entity as part of the county instead of the
state. 3 To assess the state's control over the entity, the First Circuit consid-
ered how many of the entity's board members the governor appointed and
whether the governor had the power to remove board members or veto the
entity's decisions.54 Courts in other circuits, however, did not take the state's
veto power into consideration.55 In addition, although the Tenth and Third
Circuits considered whether the entity can sue and be sued under the control
factor, enter into contracts in its own name, and take, hold, and handle real
and personal property, other circuits did not.! Moreover, what constitutes a
factor in one circuit is an element in another used to evaluate whether a fac-
tor is met.57
The circuits also afford varying weight to the elements and factors. Al-
though the First Circuit did not give much weight to the enabling statute's
indication that the entity was not a political subdivision," the Eleventh Circuit
devant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000); Duke v. Grady Mun. Schs., 127 F.3d 972,
978-982 (10th Cir. 1997); Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir.
1994).
51. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. The confusion among the circuits may result
from the lack of guidance from Hess. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433.
52. Fresenius Med. Care Cardio. Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322
F.3d 56, 68-72 (1st Cir. 2003).
53. Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11 th Cir. 2003). Other circuits
have also asked whether the entity serves state or local functions. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv.
Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 327-32 (5th Cir. 2002); Carter, 181 F.3d at 349 (Third Circuit); Harter, 101 F.3d
at 340, 342-43 (Fourth Circuit). Some scholars have criticized using the local/state government
distinction. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 756 n.217
(1978); see also Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the
1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 57 n.23 (1990).
54. Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 71-72. Contra Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d
92, 100 (1st Cir. 2002) (looking at whether the entity's annual budget was approved by the legisla-
ture and who appointed the director).
55. Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 294 F.3d 684, 694-95 (5th Cir. 2002); Shands Teaching Hosp.
& Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11 th Cir. 2000); Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218
F.3d 1160, 1167-69 (10th Cir. 2000); Indep. Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Auth., 103
F.3d 1165, 1174 (3d Cir. 1997).
56. Compare Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999) and Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 1995), with Holz v. Nenana
City Pub. Sch. Dist., 347 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) and Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 71-72.
57. Compare Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)
(considering whether an entity can sue and be sued as one independent factor) and Perez, 307 F.3d
at 327 (same), with Christy, 54 F.3d at 1144 (considering whether an entity can sue and be sued as
one of four elements to evaluate the status under state law factor).
58. Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 69 n.14.
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focused exclusively on whether a sheriff was part of a political subdivision
to determine if the state had structured the entity as an arm of the state. 9
Furthermore, although some circuits afford the state treasury factor a dis-
proportionate weight, 60 the Seventh Circuit called it the least important
factor,6' and held that an entity can be an arm of the state even if the state
treasury remains untouched.62
Courts need to apply a uniform arm-of-the-state test. The lack of uni-
formity does not promote predictability in judgments and allows judicial
fishing expeditions for factors or criteria that support a particular result. Fur-
thermore, it prevents the consistent resolution of this important federal
constitutional right of states,63 which should be the same in all parts of the
country. 64 Florida should not more easily clothe entities with Eleventh
Amendment immunity than the District of Columbia just because the Elev-
enth Circuit and courts in the District of Columbia use different tests.' A
uniform test does not mean that all school districts, for example, will have
the same arm-of-the-state status.66 Rather, the purpose is to equalize across
circuits the status of entities that are structured similarly while allowing en-
59. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309-12 (1 th Cir. 2003).
60. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm'n, 288 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 2002)
(affirming a district court decision holding that the state treasury factor outweighed the status under
state law and state control factors); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Bockes v.
Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1993)).
61. Thiel v. State Bar of Wis., 94 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Crosetto v. State Bar
of Wis., 12 F.3d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1993)). Contra Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F3d 728,
732-33 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that whether the entity has the power to raise its own funds is the
most significant factor).
62. Thiel, 94 F.3d at 401 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1995));
Scott v. O'Grady, 975 E2d 366, 372 (7th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit also does not give the treasury
factor dispositive weight although it recognizes that this factor is significantly important. United
States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 381 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2004); Perez. 307 F.3d
at 327.
63. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (noting that Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity is a constitutional right of states). The superconstitutionalist interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment asserts that state sovereign immunity is not a common law doctrine subject to Con-
gress's plenary powers, but rather a constitutionally protected state right inviolable by Congress.
Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 1211. The Supreme Court has endorsed the superconstitutionalist inter-
pretation. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (stating that
sovereign immunity is a constitutional principle that Congress cannot abrogate in state courts).
64. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (highlighting the impor-
tance of having federal courts interpret federal rights as a means of serving a federal interest in
uniformity); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995) (same).
65. For example, while the Eleventh Circuit has readily afforded immunity to private corpo-
rations acting on behalf of the state, a district court in the District of Columbia has expressed
reservations about affording immunity to entities with proprietary functions. Compare Manders v.
Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1326 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (citing Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech
St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310-11, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)), with U.S. exrel K & R Ltd. P'ship v.
Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 154 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2001).
66. Rogers suggested that the arm-of-the-state test should equalize the status of the same
types of entities. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 1243 ("Even the more traditional state-created bod-
ies, such as public universities, school districts, and highway and transit agencies, cannot always be
placed squarely in the alter ego-political subdivision dichotomy.").
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tities that are structured differently to have different status.67 Only a uniform
test assures that this federal right applies equally everywhere.
B. Unprotected Interests
Besides not providing a uniform arm-of-the-state analysis, Hess's
framework pays little attention to the effect that federal lawsuits can have on
the states' administration of their public affairs. This shortcoming compro-
mises the ability of states to deliver public services and violates an
important tenet of the Eleventh Amendment.
1. Main Purpose
The Hess Court, strictly adhering to the Eleventh Amendment's text,
stated that the impetus for the Amendment was "the prevention of federal-
court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury.'68 The Court also
noted that the most important factor in most circuits is the protection of state
treasuries and have accorded this factor dispositive weight.69 These asser-
tions were the basis for the majority's establishment of an arm-of-the-state
framework that places undue consideration on the state treasury factor.
In contrast, Justice O'Connor's dissent viewed the principal purpose of
the Eleventh Amendment as protecting state sovereignty.0 Justice O'Connor
noted that the text of the Amendment prohibits suits in law and equity and
belies the assertion that the driving concern of the Eleventh Amendment is
the protection of state treasuries." The Amendment "does not turn a blind
eye simply because the state treasury is not directly implicated." 2
A majority of the Court has since adopted the view that protecting state
treasuries is not the main purpose of the Eleventh Amendment. In Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, the Court
held that state sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Com-
mission ("FMC") from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state
ports authority violated the Shipping Act of 1984.73 The majority explained
that "the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State
treasuries ... but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign
entities. 74
67. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that using the same five-factor test, school districts in California were declared arms of the state
while school districts in Nevada were not).
68. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994)
69. Id. at 48-49.
70. Id. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
71. Id. at60.
72. Id. at 61.
73. 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002).
74. Id. at 769.
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The Court has long adhered to FMC's interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment's main purpose. Although the Amendment's language exactly
tracks the facts of Chisholm, the Amendment stands for more than what it
literally states. 5 As the Court stated over a century ago in In re Ayers, the
Eleventh Amendment sought:
[T]o prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was thought to be nei-
ther becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested
with that large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to
the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the com-
plaints of private persons ... or that the course of their public policy and
the administration of their public affairs should be subject to and con-
trolled by the mandates of judicial tribunals without their consent, and in
favor of individual interests.
6
This passage confirms the FMC Court's interpretation of the Amendment as
primarily preserving the sovereignty of states within the federal system.
2. Equal Interests
Except in Hess, the Court has not afforded disproportionate weight to
any one factor of the arm-of-the-state test. Before Hess, in explaining when
an entity should be afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court
stated in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman:
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if "the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration," or if the effect of the judgment would be
"to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.' '77
This passage specifically identifies three interests the Amendment pro-
tects through the arm-of-the-state analysis. First, the Amendment shields
state treasuries from federal-court judgments. Second, the Amendment pre-
vents federal courts from interfering with the states' public administration.
Third, the Amendment prohibits federal courts from ordering the states to do
or refrain from doing something. Not only are these interests different,78 but
the Court also did not attribute a higher status to any one of them. By failing
to supply a hierarchy of the relevant interests, the Pennhurst State Court
75. See supra note 5.
76. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). This interpretation has not gone uncontested. See
supra note 1; see also FMC, 535 U.S. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the paramount concern of
the Eleventh Amendment's framers had been protecting the so-called 'dignity' interest of the States,
surely Congress would have ... grant[ed] the States immunity from process, rather than ... merely
delineate[ing] the subject matter jurisdiction of courts.").
77. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 n.ll (1984) (quoting
Duran v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
78. See FMC, 535 U.S. at 765 (citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) ("While state sovereign immunity serves the important function of
shielding state treasuries ... the doctrine's central purpose is to 'accord the States the respect owed
to them as' joint sovereigns."); see also infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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suggested that the Eleventh Amendment is equally concerned with protect-
ing these three interests. In addition, the Court's decision to employ
balancing tests in Mount Healthy and Lake Country Estates made it appear
that these interests were relatively equal.79 Finally, the fact that, after Hess,
the Supreme Court has afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity to entities
even when the state treasury is not involved further supports the view that
the Amendment must protect other important interests.80
The disagreement about the main purpose of the Eleventh Amendment
also counsels against affording any one factor disproportionate weight. On
the one hand, the majority in Hess stated that the impetus for the Eleventh
Amendment was to protect state treasuries.8' On the other hand, a different
majority of the Court stated in FMC that the principal purpose of the
Amendment was to protect state sovereign immunity, not to protect state
treasuries." Given the narrow margin of these decisions, and that both are
grounded in plausible readings of the history of the Amendment, the arm-of-
the-state analysis should not afford more protection to one interest than to
any other. Instead, consistent with the balancing approach that the Court has
historically applied, and its description of the test in Pennhurst State, the
arm-of-the-state analysis should treat these interests as equal to protect ap-
propriately all legitimate Eleventh Amendment interests.
3. Independent Evaluation
Although Eleventh Amendment interests are interrelated, independent
examination of each is necessary to protect them fully. In Pennhurst State,
the Court identified three equally legitimate and distinct Eleventh Amend-
ment interests: (1) protecting state treasuries; (2) protecting states from
federal court interference in their public affairs; and (3) protecting state dig-
.3
nity interests. Perhaps the reason to protect state treasuries is to safeguard
79. A literal reading of the above quoted passages in In re Ayers and Pennhurst State might
lead to the conclusion that an entity that meets one of the three identified factors should be afforded
immunity. Such a reading, however, would contravene the traditional balancing of the different
factors that courts have undertaken. Furthermore, to protect the mMjltiple purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment, it is necessary to evaluate more than one factor.
80. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (holding that the Univer-
sity of California had Eleventh Amendment immunity even if the State of Califomia would not have
to actually pay a judgment against the University); FMC, 535 U.S. at 749, 765 (holding that the
South Carolina Ports Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection even if a Federal
Maritime Commission proceeding did not present a threat to the financial integrity of the state).
81. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994).
82. FMC, 535 U.S. at 769. FMC and Hess were decided by one vote and, notably, Justice
Kennedy was in the majority both times. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden suggests that
he would support FMC's version of the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment confirmed sovereign immunity as a
constitutional principle).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79. Protecting the dignity interests of the states is
the same as trying to avoid restraining them from acting or compelling them to act. See Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment protects the
dignity interests of unconsenting states in not being subject to coercive judicial processes at the
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the states' prerogative to manage their public affairs because the function of
a state's treasury is to finance the state's administration.84 In other words,
protecting state treasuries may be the means to protect the states' autonomy
to make policy choices. Nevertheless, independent examination of these
interests is necessary because a federal court can interfere with a state's ad-
ministration of its affairs even if the state's treasury is not implicated. For
example, if a court concludes that a port authority is not entitled to immu-
nity because of its traditional financial independence, a multimillion-dollar
judgment against it would inevitably interfere with the state's transportation
affairs because money earmarked for financing operations or new develop-
ment projects would have to be reallocated to satisfy the judgment." A
judgment against a state-created hospital/research entity that raises its own
funds, like the Cardiovascular Center in Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovas-
cular Resources, Inc. v. Puerto Rico & the Caribbean Cardiovascular
86Center Corp., may affect the entity's ability to buy new equipment and
hamper its state-delegated mission to provide health services, although it
may not affect the state's treasury directly. As the Eleventh Circuit has rec-
ognized, a judgment against an entity affects that entity's ability to perform
state functions even though the state may not be legally liable for the judg-
ment.87 Thus, the arm-of-the-state test should independently examine the
Eleventh Amendment's three equally legitimate interests.
C. Public Policy
The Hess approach also creates undesirable public policy consequences
because it sends states the message that only entities that are heavily de-
pendent on state funds, or those for which the state is legally liable, will be88
immune from suit in federal court. Consequently, states create financially
instance of private parties). While the state's interest in being free from federal court intervention in
its public affairs might also be characterized as a dignity interest, these two interests are not the
same. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
84. See Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 1242 ("Sovereign immunity, on the other hand, keeps
judicial and political processes separate, by allowing the political process, rather than the judiciary,
to make necessary judgment calls as to 'the allocation of scare resources among competing needs
and interests.' ") (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 751).
85. Even if the port authority has insurance coverage for judgments against it, higher insur-
ance premiums would likely force it to reallocate its resources. Moreover, legal liability weighs in
favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Doe, 519 U.S. at 431.
86. Fresenius Med. Care Cardio. Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322
F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003).
87. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327-28 (1lth Cir. 2003) ("Sheriff Peterson ... would
have to pay any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official role out of the budget of
the sheriff's office. If a significant adverse judgment occurs, . .. state funds are implicated because
Sheriff Peterson would need to seek a greater total budget from ... the State."); Shands Teaching
Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F3d 1308, 1312 (11 th Cir. 2000) ("Any analysis by the
court of the State's obligations under the various contractual provisions [between the State of Flor-
ida and a private entity administering a state program] would impermissibly intrude upon the future
administration of the state program.").
88. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 (1994); see also supra note 35.
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independent entities at the expense of not clothing them with immunity
from suit.s9 An entity's financial independence should not count against im-
munity for a number of reasons.
First, such an arm-of-the-state approach does not promote effective pub-
lic administration because it discourages states from creating financially
independent entities. 90 States might consider immunity vital for some enti-
ties to free them from the obligation to spend valuable resources in
defending federal suits. Reluctance to afford immunity to entities that are
capable of raising their own revenue promotes unnecessary dependence and
waste of public resources.
Second, constraining the policy discretion of states in structuring their
entities is against the Eleventh Amendment's interest in restricting the inter-
ference of federal courts in the states' administration of their affairs.9, States
have legitimate reasons to create financially independent entities while si-
multaneously clothing them with immunity.92 They may not have the funds
to finance an entity or may determine that there are better uses for scarce
public resources. The arm-of-the-state test should not constrain these
choices; otherwise federal courts could threaten the states' functions and
dignity interests.93
Third, this framework provides a disincentive for private entities to part-
ner with the state in delivering public services if there is a high risk of
federal lawsuits. The private sector provides a great deal of public services
94
and public-private partnerships can be more efficient than public investment
and government supply of services.9 These partnerships, however, often
89. See Kelly Knivila, Note, Public Universities and the Eleventh Amendment, 78 GEO. L.J.
1723, 1728 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's "emphasis on fiscal and nonfiscal indications
of autonomy is inadequate when applied to public universities" because "[t]he inquiry might dis-
courage states from promoting institutional autonomy for fear that too great a grant of independence
will strip the university of its [E]leventh [A]mendment immunity").
90. See id. at 1745 (arguing that a presumption that the state does not intend to clothe an
entity with immunity when it gives it considerable autonomy may discourage states from structuring
important government entities in the most effective manner possible).
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. The fact that a state creates a financially independent entity does not mean that it does
not consider it an arm of the state. States may create autonomous or financially independent entities
while still intending to clothe them with their immunity so that the entities' public functions are not
impaired. See Knivila, supra note 89, at 1729.
93. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328-29 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (arguing that the state's sover-
eignty and integrity are directly affected when federal court lawsuits interfere with a state program
or function). The states' dignity interests, however, are not only implicated by the federal court's
intervention in a state function. States have an independent dignity interest in not being forced into
federal court by private parties. See supra text accompanying note 76.
94. Michelle Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Challenge: Recon-
ciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REv. 799,
823 (2002) (explaining that the majority of government social service programs are already deliv-
ered by the private sector).
95. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [IMF], FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP'T, PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS 3 (2004), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.pdf.
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face significant risks and the private party bears most of these risks.96 The
private party is especially exposed to the legislative and government policy
risk, which is the risk that the government is immune from legal action or
that it will legislate in a way that negatively impacts the partnership.97 Pub-
lic-private partnerships could be much more unattractive to the private party
if, besides the legislative and government policy risk, courts summarily deny
the private party the ability to claim the state's immunity from suit when
delivering public services on behalf of the state. If the risk of federal law-
suits against the private party is high and immunity is not an alternative, the
government may have to provide a much more expensive premium than
immunity to the private party.9
II. A UNIFORM THREE-PRONG TEST
As discussed in Part I, courts need a uniform test that protects the three
equally legitimate Eleventh Amendment interests. This Part offers a three-
prong arm-of-the-state test that fulfills that need. Section lI.A explains each
of the three factors of the test: (1) state intent; (2) state liability; and (3) state
function. Although the factors are not a radical departure from those courts
have historically considered, this test provides a limited number of clear
criteria to evaluate each factor and gives equal consideration to the three
Eleventh Amendment interests. Section II.B shows the impact the test would
have on the arm-of-the-state jurisprudence and Section II.C argues for the
adoption of the test.
A. The Test
Under the first factor of this test, courts would examine the statutory de-
scription of the entity and how much control the state exerts over the entity.9
The second factor looks at the state's legal and practical liability for the en-
96. These risks include construction risks, financial risks, performance risks, demand risks,
and residual value risks. Id. at 12. Not every public-private partnership will be subject to all of these
risks because the level of involvement of the private party varies from project to project.
97. QUEENSLAND GOV'T, STATE DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS GUIDANCE
MATERIAL: RISK MANAGEMENT 6, 38 (2002), http://coordinatorgeneral.qld.gov.au/library/pdf/ppp/
ppp-overview.pdf.
98. Id. at 6 ("If the risk is one with a significant probability of interrupting or diminishing
the payment stream that will service debt, the Private Party (debt financiers) will demand a signifi-
cant premium to accept that risk. This significantly increases the costs of financing the project.").
99. This test, like any other, is not employed if the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). A state waives its immunity by stating
such a waiver through express language or by voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999); Edel-
man v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1994). A state does not waive its immunity to suit in federal
courts by consenting to suits in its own courts, by stating its intention to sue and be sued, or even by
authorizing suits against it in any court of competent jurisdiction. Fla. Dep't of Health and Rehabili-
tative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-150 (1981) (per curiam); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-579 (1946); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436,
441-445 (1900).
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tity's debts. Finally, the third factor assesses whether the entity is perform-
ing a function on behalf of the state.
Unlike other tests, this test equally weighs the three Eleventh Amend-
ment interests to protect them fully.'0° Given that all three factors have the
same weight, courts should only afford immunity if at least two of these
factors are met. Immunity should extend only to those entities so closely
aligned with the state that they act on its behalf because the text of the Elev-
enth Amendment affords immunity only to states.' O' Requiring that two
factors are met ensures that an entity will be immune only when Eleventh
Amendment interests are strongly implicated.
1. State Intent
The first inquiry is whether the state intended to provide the entity with
immunity. The requisite intent can be met if the entity's enabling statute:
(1) describes the entity as an arm of the state; or (2) indicates that the state
controls the entity. Statutory language is the main indicator of intent under
this test because the entity's description is the best assessment of a state's
intent. This test eliminates the consideration of state court decisions in de-
termining state intent because Eleventh Amendment immunity is a federal
question that federal courts, not state courts, must decide.
a. Description
A state can express its intent to clothe an entity with its immunity from
suit by describing it as an arm of the state, public or state agency or instru-
mentality, or not a political subdivision.' 2 If the enabling statute describes
the entity as a political subdivision or a municipal corporation, then the state
intent factor is not met.'0 3 If the enabling statute describes the entity as a
public corporation, the court should determine the precise nature of the en-
tity established under state law. '04 If state law describes the public
100. See supra Section I.B.
101. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-02 (em-
phasizing that the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, affords immunity to "one of the United
States" and that the immunity is only extended to agencies exercising state power).
102. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel K & R Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 154 F. Supp. 2d 19,
22 (D.D.C. 2001) (describing the entity as a "public instrumentality").
103. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to political subdivisions such as coun-
ties, municipalities, and similar municipal corporations. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401;
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
104. Univ. of R.I. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719 (1973)). Public corporations, just like political subdivisions,
are not considered arms of the state. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll., 221 U.S. 636, 645
(1911). Courts have recently, however, distinguished between political subdivisions and public
corporations and entertained the question of whether some public corporations are arms of the state.
See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1994); Moor, 411 U.S. at
719; Fresenius Med. Care Cardio. Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56,
61 (1st Cir. 2003); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999). This distinction makes sense because political subdivisions such as counties are accountable
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corporation as a purely local entity, then the state intent factor is not met. 05
If there are inconsistent descriptions of the entity in the statute or the entity
does not fall within one of these categories, then a court should look at the
control the state exercises over the entity.
One problem of considering the description of the entity is sham label-
ing.'0 This is not a serious concern under the three-factor test proposed in
this Note, however, because the description of the entity only determines
state intent. For arm-of-the-state status, an entity needs to meet two out of
three factors, which reduces the risk of sham labeling.'07 Courts have at-
tempted to mitigate sham labeling by assessing whether an entity labeled as
an instrumentality has the same characteristics of other arms of the state."'
This type of examination, however, expands and complicates the state intent
inquiry and forces courts to look into factors that are not that important.' °9 In
addition, the sharing of attributes is not a good reflection of state intent be-
cause a state might have legitimate reasons for creating entities with some
powers traditionally indicative of arm-of-the state status while still not in-
tending to clothe them with immunity. For example, a state might immunize
an entity from state taxation to ease financial burdens but might not intend
to immunize the entity from federal civil rights violations." ° Comparing
entities to determine whether the state has extended its immunity to a par-
ticular entity constrains the state's ability to structure its entities. This
examination also goes against the presumption that states act in good faith
and against the judicial practice of not second-guessing the legislature's in-
tentions."'
to the particular citizens of a locality whereas public corporations may be accountable to the state as
a whole.
105. See Moor, 411 U.S. at718-19.
106. See, e.g., Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1232 n.5 ("Though the name of the school includes the
word 'State,' mere labeling of a governmental entity is not sufficient to find it an 'arm of the
state.' ").
107. Even though the amount of funds an entity receives from the state and the function the
state entrusts it with are not indicative of state intent under this test, it is likely that a state will pro-
vide an entity with a significant amount of funds or that it will entrust the entity with the
performance of a state function if the state describes it as an arm of the state. Thus, in most cases,
these two factors would often function as corroborative evidence that the state means what it says.
108. See, e.g., Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 68-69. Some characteristics which courts have consid-
ered are the legal powers of the entity, such as whether it can sue and be sued, enter into contracts,
hold property in its own name, or is exempt from state taxation, to test the real status of an entity.
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 E Supp. 127, 152 (W.D.N.Y 1997).
109. See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 E3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that
whether the agency has authority to enter into litigation and hold property are less important factors
than the source of the entity's funds); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting
that where a California school district could sue and be sued and hold property in its own name,
these two factors weighed against a finding of immunity, but they were not entitled to as much
weight as the other three).
110. See Barbara Kritchevsky Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
35, 39, 78 (2004) (noting that a broad scope of liability for prisons run by private entities helps to
ensure accountability for civil rights violations of prisoners).
Ill. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (stating an unwillingness to assume that
the states would refuse to honor the Constitution or the binding laws of the United States).
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b. Control
Alternatively, a court can find the requisite intent by assessing the con-
trol the state has over the entity's decision-making process. A state controls
an entity's decision-making process if it can directly appoint a majority of
the officers or board members of the entity" 2 or if it can veto the entity's
decisions."3 Examining the enabling statute readily indicates if either of
these elements is met. These types of control-appointment and veto-
evince the state's intent to make the entity one of its arms. 114 The appoint-
ment power ensures control over the entity's decision-making process,
because the state can choose members who share its particular policy pref-
erences. Similarly, the veto power affords the state substantial control over
entity outcomes, which signals that the entity is acting on behalf of the
state."5
The power to remove those appointed is not necessary under this test to
meet the control element. Undoubtedly, the power to remove would also
signal the state's intention to check the decision-making power of an en-
tity." 6 If such power is required, however, states may not afford some
entities the independence they need to perform their public duties effec-
tively.' ' 7 The arm-of-the-state test must be flexible enough to allow states to
structure their entities in a way that does not compromise their public func-
tions.
Other forms of control are excluded because they are not good indicators
of state intent to immunize the entity. First, as the Hess majority found, the
power of the state to "destroy or reshape" its political subdivisions is not a
good indicator of the state's intent to share its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity."'A state reveals its intent to share immunity by controlling the
decision-making processes of an entity.' 9 The power to destroy or reshape
political subdivisions does not allow the state to control these processes be-
cause it does not guarantee the influence over the leadership of these entities
that the appointment and veto power have. Second, the informal political
dynamics could be such that the state almost always gets to decide what the
112. See, e.g, Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999) (finding that the state clearly exercised control over a school because the school's board con-
sisted solely of state board of education members).
113. See, e.g., Thiel v. State Bar of Wis., 94 F.3d 399, 401,402 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court retained ultimate authority to review the State Bar of Wisconsin's By-
laws).
114. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 61 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("If the lines of oversight are clear and substantial-for example, if the State appoints and
removes the entity's governing personnel and retains veto or approval power over an entity's under-
takings-then the entity should be deemed an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.").
115. Id.
116. Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223, 228 (1986).
117. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
118. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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entity would do. Gauging this type of control, however, is very difficult for
courts to do."2 Informal instances of control do not evince strong state intent
to make an entity its arm because the state does not legally constrain the
entity's decision-making authority. Measuring control based on what really
matters-appointment power and veto power-is much more efficient and
feasible."'
Although some circuits consider the control factor separately from the
state intent factor, control should be considered an element of the state
intent factor for two reasons. First, the enabling statute could be poorly
drafted or non-existent, making it hard to decipher intent. Second, the de-
gree of control the state exercises over an entity is generally indicative of its
intent in creating the entity. M
c. Excluded Elements
Courts should not consider other potential indicators of state intent.
Among these, the evaluation of state court decisions is perhaps the most124
common. State court decisions have limited usefulness and have not been
• 125
consistently weighed. In addition, gauging state intent from state court
decisions is sometimes burdensome for federal courts. 126 Federal courts have
120. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 1265 ("[Tjhe power to appoint may be restricted by other
political dynamics that may escape the court's scrutiny.").
121. Hess, 513 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the control inquiry "should
turn on real, immediate control and oversight, rather than on the potentiality of a State taking action
to seize the reins").
122. Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering how
the governing members of the entity were appointed independently from whether the state had veto
power over the entity's actions); Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1995)
(considering the "degree of autonomy the agency enjoys" independently from the entity's status
under state law).
123. See supra note 114. This general assumption does not hold in the case of public universi-
ties, however, where state control might directly impair the purposes of the university. See Knivila,
supra note 89, at 1728. While allowing control to reflect state intent to clothe an entity with immu-
nity might create disincentives for entity autonomy, this danger is mitigated by the fact that this
factor can be met through statutory description of the entity as an agency, instrumentality, or arm of
the state. In addition, state control is not determinative of arm-of-the-state status under this test.
124. See, e.g., Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 E3d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 2002); Harter
v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 1996).
125. The Hess Court ruled that the Authority was not an arm of the state despite the fact that
state courts had repeatedly characterized the Authority as "an agency of the States." 513 U.S. at 45,
52. Compare Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (not giving defer-
ence to decisions of Utah courts that had consistently held that school districts shared the state's
sovereign immunity), with Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000) (giving some
deference to the Colorado Supreme Court's determination that the entity was an arm of the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes). Despite Hess's rejection of state court interpretations of the Au-
thority, the First and Third Circuits have afforded great deference to state court treatment of entities.
Redondo Constr. Corp. v. P.R. Highway and Transp. Auth., 357 F.3d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 2004);
Christy, 54 F.3d at 1148.
126. See Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 295 (concluding that the inconsistent ways New York state
courts had treated the Thruway Authority made it impossible to know whether it was an independent
corporation or a traditional state agency).
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also afforded little weight to state court decisions because determining
• • 127
whether an entity is an arm of the state is a federal question. Another way
to assess intent is by asking whether the state has disclaimed legal liability
for the entity's debts. 2 A state's disclaimer of liability, however, is an im-
perfect indicator of intent because the state may want the entity to be liable
for suits to enhance accountability. 29
'. 2. State Liability
The second factor courts should consider is whether the state would be
responsible for a judgment against the entity. This factor is included to fol-
low Doe, ,30 because it is the most direct trigger of the Eleventh
Amendment,'3 ' and because it is undoubtedly the most prevalent among cir-
cuits.'32 This factor can be met if the entity's enabling statute establishes that
the state is legally responsible for the entity's debts or judgments against
it. 133
Alternatively, if the statute does not specify whether the state is legally
liable for the entity's debts, the factor can be met if the state provides more
than half of the entity's total funds. Courts that consider the amount of funds
an entity receives from the state have never established the exact proportion
of state funds necessary to meet this factor. The First Circuit has come
closest to articulating a clear standard by concluding that this factor was not
met because "the majority of PRCCCC's funding now comes from sources
other than the Commonwealth's treasury."'35 Given that more than half is the
narrowest interpretation of a majority, it is reasonable to find this factor met
when an entity receives such a proportion of funds from the state. If more than
half of an entity's budget is comprised of state funds, that entity undoubtedly
receives the lion's share of its funds from the state and a court could infer that
a judgment against the entity would affect the state's treasury.136 In addition,
127. See, e.g., Sturdevant, 218 F.3d at 1164; Ambus, 995 F.2d at 995.
128. See Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd,
495 U.S. 299 (1990) (noting that the states' disclaimer of responsibility from the entity's expenses,
including liability for personal injury judgments, evinces intent to protect the states' treasuries),
cited in Hess, 513 U.S. at 46.
129. See Kritchevsky, supra note 110, at 78-79.
130. See supra note 35.
131. DURCHSLAG, supra note 3, at 3.
132. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47-49; see supra notes 38-41, 48-50.
133. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
134. The Fifth Circuit concluded that this factor was met because the Centers received a
"lion's share" of their funds from the state, although the court did not specify what percentage this
represented. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). The Supreme
Court only indicated that the Port Authority was "financed predominantly by private funds." Hess,
513 U.S. at 45.
135. Fresenius Med. Care Cardio. Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322
F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir. 2003).
136. Perez, 307 F.3d at 327-28.
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when an entity receives more than half of its funding from the state, the leg-
islature has made an important policy commitment. Requiring such an entity
to pay a judgment could hinder the purpose for which the state provided
those funds, especially if there are many other suits.
Determining if more than half of the entity's budget comes from state
funds might be difficult in some cases. For example, the share of the entity's
budget coming from the state might vary from year to year. In such a case, a
court should examine the entity's budget for the year in which the judgment
would be satisfied because that is the most relevant period of time in deter-
mining the vulnerability of the state's purse.137
This factor adopts both Doe's legal liability standard 138 and the practical
impact arguments the Eleventh Circuit advanced in Manders v. Lee. 3 9 Legal
liability is the most specific element protecting the state's purse. In the ab-
sence of a clear statutory statement regarding the state's legal responsibility
for the entity's debts, courts should consider the financial impact of the
judgment on the state's treasury to protect the Amendment's interest in
shielding state treasuries from federal courts.
This factor could be met even if an entity has the ability to raise its own
revenues. 14 A state may have the obligation to satisfy a judgment against the
entity despite the entity's ability to raise its own revenues. In addition, an
entity's ability to raise its own revenues does not necessarily reflect the
state's intent that the entity live exclusively by its own means; it might re-
flect the nature of its operations or insufficient state resources to fund it.
Moreover, making financial independence count against immunity does not
promote efficient public administration. 141
3. State Function
The third factor is whether the entity performs a state function. An entity
performs a state function if it is a state's exclusive agent in discharging a
• 142
public function statewide. Admittedly, an entity likely performs a state
function if the enabling legislation describes it as an ann or an instrumental-
ity of the state. The first and third factors nonetheless remain
distinguishable. The first factor refers to how the state has described the en-
tity while the third refers to the function the state has assigned to the entity.
137. Mancuso v. N.Y State Thruway Auth., 86 E3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe arm-of-
the-state doctrine focuses not on initial funding, but on current funding." (citing Ristow v. S.C. Ports
Auth., 58 F.3d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1994))).
138. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 431 (1997)
139. Manders v. Lee, 338 F3d 1304, 1327-28 (1 lth Cir. 2003); see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
140. Contra U.S. exrel K & R Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 154 F. Supp. 2d 19,23
(D.D.C. 2001).
141. See supra Section I.C.
142. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F3d 1308, 1311
(11 th Cir. 2000).
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In addition, the third factor cannot be met through statutory language, but
rather through an independent assessment of the entity's function.,
4
Courts should conduct an independent evaluation to ensure that a suit
would not interfere with the state's administration of its affairs. Gauging
whether an entity performs a public function could be a burdensome inquiry
for courts to undertake. Under this test, however, state function is nar-
rowly defined to avoid this problem: an entity performs a state function only
when the state has a constitutional or statutory obligation that it must carry
out itself statewide and that it delegates exclusively to the entity.1
45
This narrow construction of the state function factor derives from the
Eleventh Amendment's principle of non-interference with a state's
prerogative to administer its affairs. A state will only obligate itself to carry
out functions that it considers essential to the public welfare.14 6 Therefore,
such a function can be considered an affair of the state entitled to a
considerable presumption of Eleventh Amendment protection. 47 When a
state delegates that function exclusively to an entity, it is as if the state were
carrying out that function itself because, in either case, there would be a
single provider for the service. A federal lawsuit against the entity to which
the state has exclusively delegated an important public function, therefore, is
a suit against the state itself. In both instances, whether the suit is against the
state or the entity, private parties attack the only provider of that service.
Thus, exactly the same considerations that support Eleventh Amendment
protection for the state also support protection for an entity that is
exclusively performing a public function on behalf of the state. 48 This is not
necessarily the case when the state delegates a function to multiple entities.
In such a case, a federal lawsuit against the entity does not interfere to the
same extent with the state's administration of its affairs because there are
143. In fact, all three factors are distinguishable. An entity may not be described as an agency
or receive state funds, but still perform a public function. See Shands, 208 F.3d at 1311 (identifying
some private corporations that, while not funded or controlled by the state, were afforded immunity
because they were acting as agents of the state). Alternatively, a state may delegate to an entity a
state function without necessarily intending to bestow it with its immunity to enhance the entity's
accountability. See Kritchevsky, supra note 110, at 48.
144. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 1302 (describing the inquiry as unintelligible); see also
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between private and state action).
145. Under the state action doctrine, "public function" is defined as a function that has been
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state'" Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842
(1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). The definition of state
function under this test is different because there is no need to inquire about the traditional nature of
the function. As long as the state commits itself to carry out a function, even if this function is not a
traditional one for the state, it is a state function for purposes of this factor.
146. See S.D. Cement Plant Comm'n v. Wasau Underwriters Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1515,
1520-22 (D.S.D 1991) (holding that the state cement plant was an arm of the state in part because
the South Dakota Constitution and a corresponding statute established that the sale and manufacture
of cement was a public function and because the legislature aimed to improve the quality of life by
establishing a cement program).
147. See id. at 1521-22.
148. See Shands, 208 F.3d at 1311 (collecting cases).
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other providers. Likewise, when a state delegates a function for an entity to
perform in a specific territorial boundary, and the entity is not a division of a
statewide system, the effects of any lawsuit will be felt only locally. The
narrow definition of the state function factor ensures that the protection that
this factor provides is only applicable when a federal lawsuit represents a
substantial threat to the public welfare.
The Beech Street Corporation in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics,
Inc. v. Beech Street Corp.149 is an example of an entity that meets the state
function factor. The state of Florida has a statutory obligation to "offer a
comprehensive package of health insurance and retirement benefits and a
personnel system for state employees."'"5 The Department of Management
Services, responsible for managing Florida's health insurance program, con-
tracted with Unisys Corporation to fulfill this function.'' Unisys then
subcontracted with Beech Street Corporation.5 2 Therefore, the State of Flor-
ida delegated exclusively to Unisys and Beech Street a public function that
the State had a statutory obligation to perform statewide. 153
An entity can meet the state function factor even if it performs the func-
' 54
tion only within a particular locality. The entity must be a part of a
statewide system, not an independent entity of that system, and be exclu-
sively performing a statewide function that other parts of that system are
not. The centers in Perez v. Research 20 Education Service Center are ex-
amples of such an entity. 55 Pursuant to the state's constitution, which
requires it to "establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools,' 15 6 the Texas Leg-
islature created the Centers to enable school districts to operate more
efficiently and economically and to implement statewide initiatives.1
57
Unlike the local school districts, which are independent and only perform
local functions, the Centers are controlled by the Commissioner of Educa-
149. Id. at 1308.
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.123 (West 2006).
151. Shands, 208 F.3d at 1309-10.
152. Id. at 1310.
153. Contra Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). On the facts of Rendell-Baker, the
public function factor would not be met because the private corporation was one of the many insti-
tutions Massachusetts could contract with simultaneously to fulfill its statutory duty to develop
suitable educational programs for special education students. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B,
§§ 3-4 (West 1981); see Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 834.
154. See Voght v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 695 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 E3d 315, 321-22 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2001);
Delahoussaye v. New Iberia, 937 F2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1991)) (noting that although limited territo-
rial boundaries suggest that an agency is not an arm of the state, an exception applies when a
regional entity is an administrative division of a statewide system). The Orleans Levee District, an
entity created by the Louisiana legislature to protect New Orleans from floods, was held to not be an
administrative division of the state because there were 19 levee districts in the state of Louisiana and
they were not part of a larger system. Id.
155. 307 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2002).
156. TEX. CONsT. art. VII, § 1.
157. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8.002 (Vernon 2006).
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tion and administer statewide programs.'58 The Centers satisfy the state func-
tion factor because they have been exclusively delegated the function of
ensuring the efficiency of the local school districts and are the only entity in
the educational system performing this duty statewide. 9
While there are questions about the appropriateness of public-function
inquiries in the arm-of-the-state analysis, evaluating this factor is crucial
to further the Eleventh Amendment's interest in not interfering with the
states' administration of their public affairs. Allowing a suit in federal court
against an entity without considering whether the state has entrusted it with
the performance of a public function would interfere with the "course of
[the states'] public policy and the administration of their public affairs.' 6'
The fact that some circuits employ the governmental-proprietary function
factor highlights the importance of examining an entity's functions.'
62
B. The Test's Impact
This test, unlike those most circuits apply, weighs all factors equally but
would not alter the results that the Supreme Court reached in important arm-
of-the-state cases. The decisions of the Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
will be particularly affected because these circuits have afforded the state
treasury factor dispositive weight. In accord with the Court's decision in
Lake Country Estates, however, TRPA would be immune because it was a
political subdivision that was not funded by California and Nevada. 64
158. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2002). State func-
tions are not to be confused with the public functions that local governments perform. Local
governments, although created by the states, do not perform state functions under this test because
they are autonomous political entities that administer a particular territorial boundary, not statewide
programs.
159. See id. at 330-31; TEx. EDUC. AGENCY, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 2005-
2009 PERIOD XX (2004), http://www.tea.state.tx.us/stplan/0509-stratplan.pdf. But see McMillian v.
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 788 (1997). Sheriffs in Alabama would not meet the state function
factor because they share with the Alabama Department of Public Safety the function of enforcing
state criminal law. Id. at 790; Alabama Department of Public Safety, Welcome Message from Colo-
nel W. M. Coppage and Lieutenant Colonel Glenda Deese, http://www.dps.state.al.us/public/misc/
welcome/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
160. See supra note 144.
161. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); see supra text accompanying note 76.
162. The First and Eleventh Circuits, as well as a district court in the District of Columbia,
have highlighted the importance of considering the entity's functions. See Fresenius Med. Care
Cardio. Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardio. Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003); Wojcik
v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 99 (lst Cir. 2002); Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Tran-
sit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 225 (D.C. Cir.1986); U.S. ex rel K & R Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin.
Agency, 154 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit afforded the same weight to
the state treasury factor and whether the suit would interfere with the state's administration of its
public affairs. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311-12
(11 th Cir. 2000).
163. See supra notes 49, 60.
164. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Court in Mount Healthy and in Lake
Country Estates did not conclude that the entities were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity immediately after finding that they were political subdivisions under state law, but rather
considered this as a factor to balance against other factors. See supra notes 7, 13. Likewise, under
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An examination of Hess illustrates that the effect of this test depends on
the structure of a particular entity under state law. First, the Authority meets
the state intent factor even though the entity's enabling statute is ambiguous
in describing the entity. The enabling statute describes the Authority as the
"municipal corporate instrumentality of the two states for the purpose of
developing the port [of New York] and effectuating the pledge of the states
in the said compact."' 65 The statute also describes the authority as "a body,
both corporate and politic, with full power and authority to purchase, con-
struct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within said
district."' 1 In a different section, the statute provides that the Authority
"which was created by agreement of the [two] states as their joint agent for
the development of the transportation and terminal facilities.., is the proper
agency to act in their behalf ... to effectuate, as a unified project, the said
interurban electric railway and its extensions."'' 67 Because the enabling stat-
ute is ambiguous,16 a court must look at the control the state exercises over
the Authority. In this case, the states of New York and New Jersey can ap-
point and remove the commissioners of the Authority. 69 Moreover, the states
can veto the entity's decisions.' 70 Thus, the Authority meets the state intent
factor.
The other two factors are not met. The states of New York and New Jer-
sey are not legally liable for the Authority's debts and they do not provide it
with any funds. 7' In addition, the Authority does not perform a state func-
tion. The states of New York and New Jersey pledged their "faithful co-
operation in the future planning and development of the port of New
York."' 72 They delegated their obligation to plan and develop the port of New
York exclusively to the Authority.73 This function, however, is entirely local
as the Authority's operations are confined to a district and the entity is not
part of a statewide system administering statewide programs.174
this test, whether an entity is a political subdivision is an element of the state intent factor, which
must be considered jointly with the state treasury and state function factors. When dealing with a
county, a city, or a municipality, however, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). TRPA does not meet the state intent factor because it is
a political subdivision. It also does not meet the state treasury factor because it is funded by cities
and counties. Thus, it would not be entitled to immunity under this test because it fails to meet two
of the three factors.
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-33 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6459 (McKinney 2000)
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-7; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6407.
167. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.50(8); N.Y UNCONSOL. LAW § 6601(8).
168. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1994).
169. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-5; N.Y UNcoNsoL. LAW § 6405.
170. Hess, 513 U.S. at44.
171. Id. at 45-46.
172. N.J. STAT ANN. § 32:1-2; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6402.
173. N.J. STAT. ANN. 32:1-4, 32:1-17, 32:1-35.50(8); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6404, 6407,
6601(8).
174. N.J. STAT. ANN. 32:1-3. 32:1-7.
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Another example demonstrates how this test allows entities with finan-
cial and political independence to be considered arms of the state. The New
York State Thruway Authority is a relatively autonomous entity that would
be immune from suit under this test."1 5 First, the state intent factor is met
because, although the Thruway Authority is not described clearly as an
agency or a political subdivision, 1 6 the Governor of New York, with the ad-
vice and consent of the State Senate, appoints all three board members of
the Thruway Authority.'77 The Thruway Authority does not meet the second
factor because the State of New York is not liable for the entity's debts and
does not provide most of its funds.' Nevertheless, the Thruway Authority
meets the third factor because it performs a state function-the State of New
York obligated itself to plan and develop safe and efficient transportation
facilities. 7 9 In carrying out this duty, the State has relied exclusively on the
Thruway Authority "to finance, construct, reconstruct, improve, develop,
maintain or operate a thruway system."' 80 The State has made it clear that
"such purposes are in all respects for the benefit of the people of the state of
New York ... to facilitate transportation for their recreation and [that] the
authority shall be regarded as performing a governmental function in carry-
ing out its corporate purpose."' 8'
C. Why Should Courts Adopt this Test?
The test in this Note has several advantages over other proposed and cur-
rently employed tests. It protects legitimate Eleventh Amendment interests of
states better than other tests, but it does not give states a blank check to give
away immunity merely by stating an intent to do so. A test affording immu-
nity to an entity based solely on a state's clear statement ' 1 would give states
too much leeway and effectively remove from federal courts the responsibility
of determining which entities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Under such a test a state could, for example, immunize an entity just by de-
scribing it as state agency, regardless of the function the entity actually
performs or the amount of state funds it receives. In addition, such a test
does not respond to any of the overriding purposes of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, particularly the interest in protecting states' treasuries. These purposes
can be implicated even if the entities are not described as arms of the state.
In contrast, the test proposed in this Note combines factors that evaluate
175. The Second Circuit concluded that this entity was not an arm of the state. Mancuso v.
N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 293-94.
177. Id. at 295.
178. Id. at 295-96.
179. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1994).
180. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2004).
181. Id.
182. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 1301-05.
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statutory language and the structure that the state has given to the entity.
Furthermore, unlike other tests, 183 this test avoids affording dispositive
weight to a single factor, thus protecting the three equally legitimate Elev-
enth Amendment interests. '
This Note's test would also lead to uniformity in conducting the arm-of-
the-state analysis. Leaving circuits free to use whatever factors they consider
appropriate, and whatever elements to evaluate such factors, as Hess does,
promotes the current disarray in deciding Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Some circuits have not even used consistent approaches themselves, some-
times using different elements to evaluate the same factor in different
cases.' They have also employed vague criteria.' 86 This state of affairs has
allowed courts to pick factors and elements selectively to reach a desired
result. The proposed test eliminates these problems by giving circuits clear
guidance on what factors to analyze and how to analyze them. While the
factors might sound like they invite subjective analysis, the elements to
evaluate these factors are not open to interpretation and significantly narrow
the inquiry. Adopting this test would lead to the uniformity that such an im-
portant federal right demands.
181
Lastly, this test attempts to eliminate disincentives for effective public
administration. Current tests sometimes, intentionally or unintentionally,
equate dependency on state funds or state control with immunity. 18 This
provides disincentives for states to create financially or politically independ-
ent entities.189 This Note's test solves this problem by giving less weight to
these considerations. In fact, this test does not preclude the possibility that a
state can immunize politically or financially autonomous entities.'90
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that Hess is problematic because it failed to provide a
simple and uniform standard to determine whether an entity is an arm of the
183. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm'n, 288 F3d 519, 524 (3d Cir.
2002); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir. 1996).
184. See supra notes 5, 76-79 and accompanying text.
185. Compare Lewis v. N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 898 F. Supp. 596, 599 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (citing Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 E2d 843, 845-47 (7th Cir. 1987)) (considering the ex-
tent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state, its general legal status, and whether it serves
the state as a whole or only a region), with Crosetto v. State Bar of Wis., 12 F.3d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1993) (considering the extent of state control over the entity, the entity's role with respect to the
state, and whether a judgment against an entity would be satisfied from state funds). See also supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
186. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that
the control factor was met because the state commissioner of education had "broad authority" over
the Centers and that the state treasury factor was met because the state provided the Centers with the
"lion's share" of their budget).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 63--64.
188. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Section I.C.; supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
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state. Hess also left a core interest of the Eleventh Amendment unpro-
tected-preventing federal courts from interfering with the states'
administration of their affairs-because it did not require independent
evaluation of whether an entity serves a state function. The test proposed in
this Note attempts to correct these shortcomings. Its factors protect the mul-
tiple purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, and the structure of the test
eliminates disincentives for efficient public administration. Adopting this
test would ensure that the right of states to be immune from suit in federal
court is fully protected and adjudicated uniformly across the nation.
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